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program placement, village level heterogeneity and unobservable household attributes. 
Our results show that women’s participation in microfinance does not diminish domestic 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The intensity of domestic violence against women is more pronounced in low income 
countries like Bangladesh.1 Bangladeshi women experience high rates of domestic 
violence partly because of the patriarchal social structure of the country, which 
encourages male control over economic resources (Schuler et al. 1996). Girls learn to 
accept their dependence on the male family members, who often believe that 
education and working outside home for girls are worthless. Accordingly, women face 
difficulty in accessing the labor market and find themselves disempowered in 
household decision making.  
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh provide credit for rural poor 
women to reduce poverty (Khandker, 1998). Existing literature documents that 
providing credit to women not only contributes to poverty reduction, but also has 
positive effects on their well-being and empowerment (Pitt et al., 2006; Khandker, 
2005; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Hashemi et al, 
1996). Potentially, it should enhance their bargaining power in household decision-
making. One may therefore presume that women’s participation in credit programs 
would reduce domestic violence against them by bestowing economic power. 
However,  possession  of  such  funds  by  the  woman  can  also  cause  tension,  often  
leading to violence in the family with other members, particularly the husband, trying 
to exert control over it (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). Existing literature provides very 
little evidence on how membership in MFIs affects domestic violence. This paper 
aims  to  contribute  to  understanding  the  effect  of  women’s  participation  in  
microfinance programs on domestic violence against them by taking a carefully 
nuanced econometric approach based on primary data collected from Bangladeshi 
villages.  
We measure domestic violence considering all types of physical, sexual and/or 
psychological violence committed against a woman by her husband (Heise and 
Gottemoeller, 1999). In the literature, domestic violence (in some form or other) is 
regarded as a component in women’s empowerment. For example, Hashemi et al. 
(1996) define empowerment as a function of the female’s relative physical mobility, 
economic security, ability to make small and large purchases on her own, involvement 
in major decisions, relative freedom from domination by the family, political and legal 
                                               
1 Bangladesh ranks second among countries in domestic violence committed against women (The 
Independent, 12 June 2002). 
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awareness, and participation in public protests and political campaigning. Pitt et al. 
(2006) use similar indicators with some extra features to estimate the effect of 
microfinance on women’s empowerment. Essentially, women’s empowerment is 
considered as a broader concept, of which domestic violence is regarded as a 
component. We attempt to estimate the effect of participation in microfinance on the 
incidence of domestic violence against women, rather than women’s empowerment as 
a whole. 
Some studies have attempted to establish the relationship between women’s 
participation in credit programs and domestic violence. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) 
found that women’s participation in credit programs may have induced domestic 
violence because of their inadequate control over credit.2 However, the study 
acknowledged the inability to assess domestic violence that may be attributed solely 
to borrowing. Another study by Schuler et al. (1996) used ethnographic and structured 
survey data in rural Bangladesh, finding that membership of Grameen Bank and 
BRAC had a significant effect in reducing domestic violence against women. Their 
results were based on a comparison with the households of program and non-program 
villages. In our view, this study suffers from potential endogeneity bias originating 
from nonrandom program placement, village level heterogeneity and unobservable 
household attributes such as self-selection for a credit program. We address these 
problems by introducing a quasi-experimental sample design that allows us to include 
both program and non-program villages, and both eligible and ineligible households 
from each type of village. Eligible and ineligible households are identified by an 
eligibility rule of the credit programs.3 We use this rule as an instrument for demand 
for credit.   
Contrary to the existing results, our finding reveals that participation in 
microfinance does not reduce domestic violence significantly. We then disaggregate 
female borrowers on the basis of control over the use of credit. In our data, only 13% 
female borrowers who are able to use their own credit, are physically abused 
significantly less by their husbands than those who have limited or no control over the 
use of credit. These results complement the existing literature by providing a better 
                                               
2 Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) find that only 17.8% of female borrowers have full control over their 
credit 
3 In our sample, we consider three leading group-based credit programs (Grameen Bank, BRAC and 
ASA), all of which share the same eligibility rule, i.e., they exclude those households from joining the 
credit program who have more than 50 decimals of household land (Khandker, 1998; Khandker and 
Khalily, 1996). 
 3
understanding of how control over credit is important in improving women’s situation 
within the household by reducing domestic violence.  Our results also suggest that 
providing credit for women is not a sufficient mechanism to improve their status. It is 
important to develop mechanisms to train them in how to use credit effectively, and 
also to monitor such usage.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 offers a discussion on 
women’s status in Bangladesh; Section 3 discusses the data and variables; Section 4 
explains the estimation technique; Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 of the 
paper offers recommendations.  
 
2. THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN BANGLADESH  
Gender inequality is deeply embedded in the Bangladeshi social structure. The 
patriarchal social system does not allow women equal access to economic and 
financial resources. The life of a woman in rural Bangladesh is restricted by purdah,4 
which draws on Islamic doctrines. In general, women carry out the unpaid household 
chores  and  cannot  go  on  public  roads  or  market  places  beyond  their  home  or  
neighborhood boundary (Paul, 2002). Most women have little or no education5 and 
few marketable skills,6 no independent property or money and no socially sanctioned 
identity outside of the family (Schuler et al., 1996). Thus, women are dependent on 
male family members and the girl child is often considered as an economic burden on 
the family.  
Men in rural Bangladesh play the key role in the household decision-making 
process and usually exert power and authority over women. Women are considered as 
men’s property. Women need to carry out their household duties properly, be humble 
and obedient to their husband to escape physical abuse. Women in Bangladesh are 
beaten for negligible reasons such as the meal not being ready on time, or tasting it 
whilst cooking (Gardener, 1991).  Kabeer (1989) finds that many men beat their wives 
because of their own frustration with poverty and the resultant inability to fulfill their 
roles as providers. It is very common in Bangladesh that the barren woman, or the 
woman who gives birth only to daughters without having a son, is reproved and 
                                               
4 The word literally means curtain or veil, and the practice epitomizes the exclusion of women from 
public male space and their seclusion in the home compound. 
5 The adult literacy rate for males and females in rural Bangladesh is 57% and 45% respectively (BBS 
2006). 
6 The representation of women is only 22% within the employed working force in the broad economic 
sector in Bangladesh (BBS, 2002-2003). 
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beaten by her husband and in some cases, divorced. The dowry is another custom in 
Bangladesh that exacerbates matters.  A dowry is given to the husband's family by the 
bride's family at marriage. The husband and his family often feel that the property 
given as dowry is inadequate, which generates tensions within the household and 
induces domestic violence. The statistics provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
shown in Table 1 indicate the extent of domestic violence in Bangladesh.  
[Table 1 here] 
To be able to investigate domestic violence, we carried out a household survey 
in rural Bangladesh (the survey details are reported in section 3). Given the paucity of 
micro-level data on domestic violence in Bangladesh, one contribution of our paper is 
to  document  the  prevalence  and  severity  of  domestic  violence.  Table  3  reveals  that  
husbands often enforced control by preventing their wives from working outside 
home,  and  dictated  whom  to  vote  for.  More  than  30%  of  women  required  their  
husband’s permission to visit parents or relatives. The most common violence against 
women by their husband was threatening them with physical assault (65%).  
Figure 1 shows that 52% of women were physically assaulted, 47% were 
sexually abused and 8% were forced to leave her husband’s residence. 48% of women 
were victims of at  least  two forms of violence- the most frequent form was physical 
assault and sexual abuse and the least frequent combination was sexual abuse and 
forcible eviction. 7% of women were victims of all three types of domestic violence 
and 83% suffered at least one type of violence. These high rates of domestic violence 
are  consistent  with  a  study  conducted  by  the  International  Centre  for  Diarrhoeal  
Diseases Research in Bangladesh (ICDDR-B) in collaboration with WHO on 3130 
women of reproductive age (15-49) in urban and rural areas of Bangladesh, which 
shows that 44% of rural women experienced physical violence and 27% were 
physically or sexually abused.  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
Two laws exist to protect violence against women in Bangladesh, namely, the 
Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance (1983) and the Dowry 
Prohibition Act (1980). There are also articles in the Penal Code relating to rape. 
However, under-reporting of violence against women makes it particularly difficult to 
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prevent such domestic violence by law.7 Most of the time, women feel shame and 
guilt – as well as anger in some cases – reporting violence against them. Bangladeshi 
women see domestic violence against them as part of their lives (Schuler et al., 1996) 
and usually do not feel disrespected because of it. The lack of awareness among 
women of their legal rights and the fear that bringing charges will complicate 
problems with their husbands prevent them from reporting violence. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLE 
Our primary dataset was generated from a household survey of 69 Bangladeshi 
villages conducted during the period 2006-2007. We applied a multi-stage stratified 
random sampling technique following the BIDS-World Bank 1991-92 survey design. 
At the first stage, 487 police stations8 of Bangladesh were divided into five strata; 
Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, mixed program, and non-program strata. We randomly 
selected 4 police stations from Grameen Bank, and BRAC strata, and 5 police stations 
from the remaining three strata, i.e., a total of 23 police stations.  
We randomly selected three villages from each police station for the survey. A 
census was conducted in each of the selected villages, the purpose of which was to 
identify eligible (less than 50 decimals of land) and ineligible (50 or more decimals of 
land) households for microfinance, as well as program participating and non-
participating households in the program village. In the non-program village, a random 
sampling technique was used to draw 15 eligible and 7 ineligible households. We 
used a stratified random sampling technique to draw program participant and non-
participant households in the program villages. Based on the village census data, we 
categorized the villagers into program participant, eligible non-participant, and 
ineligible non-participant. 15 households were drawn randomly from the program 
participant category and 5 from the eligible non-participant category and 2 from the 
ineligible non-participant category.9 Overall 1,518 households were drawn for the 
survey, of which 810 (53.2%) were program participants and 708 (46.8%) were non-
participants. However, two restrictions were imposed to select data for this study. We 
excluded i) households headed by widows and widowers and  ii)  male  borrowers.  
                                               
7 68% women do not report the violence committed against them (The Daily Nayadiganta, December, 
2009). 
8 A police station is a geographical area in Bangladesh (police station was formerly called upazila); 64 
districts of the country are divided into 487 police stations. 
9 The survey design and data are described in greater detail in Aktaruzzaman (2009). 
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Thus, we ended up with 1344 households as a sample for this study, in which 696 
(51.7%) are female borrowers and 648 (48.3%) are non-borrowers. 
We split female borrowers into two categories on the basis of the control over 
credit. Type 1– active borrowers: who have full control over the use of credit. In our 
sample, only 94 (13.5%) female borrowers are active. Type 2– passive borrowers: 
who  do  not  have  full  control  over  the  use  of  credit,  i.e.,  credit  is  being  used  either  
solely by the husband or jointly in this sense. In our sample, 86.5% of female 
borrowers are passive borrowers. Splitting the data helps to identify the credit effect 
differently by control over the credit.  The motivation of such splitting rises from 
early studies by Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996), who presume that control over credit, 
and not merely across to it, is important in empowering women. 
[Figure 2 here] 
We modified the BIDS-World Bank 1991/92 household survey questionnaire 
by including domestic violence related questions in it. In the questionnaire we split 
the domestic violence related questions into two parts, namely, psychological and 
physical violence. 
Violence which arises from threats or common assault is defined as 
Psychological  Domestic  Violence  (PDV).  To  measure  the  PDV,  we  asked  11  
questions.10 The answers to which are binary (YES-1 and NO-0). Factor analysis has 
been used to construct a single variable out of these 11 variables (Pitt and Khandker, 
2006).11 We call the resulting variable PDV.  
Three questions concerning physical abuse were asked to quantify Physical 
Domestic Violence (PhDV).12 The  answers  to  the  questions  are  also  binary  (YES-1  
and  NO-0).  We  use  factor  analysis  to  construct  a  single  variable  out  of  these  3  
variables. We call the resulting variable PhDV. 
[Figure 3 and 4 here] 
 Figures 3 and 4 present all the questions that were used to measure PDV 
and PhDV by category of household. Both figures show that active borrowers are less 
                                               
10 In fact, we asked 12 questions. One was “Has your husband threatened to pour acid on you?” Only 
.14% borrower and .31% non-borrower has received such a threat. Therefore, we exclude that question 
from farther analysis. Acid throwing is one of the most despicable forms of violence against women. 
However, such violence usually committed by people outside the household members. 
11 The main applications of factor analytic techniques are to reduce the number of variables and to 
detect structure in the relationships between variables. 
12 In fact, four questions were asked. We asked “Did your husband pour acid on you?” Only .01% of 
borrowers and .012% of non-borrowers were suffered to such a threat. Therefore, we exclude that 
question from the factor analysis. 
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of victimized (except threats of murder) than passive and non-borrowers by all 
indicators of domestic violence. On average, PDV of passive borrowers is similar to 
non-borrowers but experience more PhDV than non-borrowers.   
 [Table 3 and 4 here] 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the basic descriptive statistics of indicators of domestic 
violence by category of household. Table 3 shows that out of 11 indicators of PDV, 
active borrowers face significantly less PDV on 5 indicators than passive borrowers. 
That is, active borrowers on average face significantly less obstacles to work outside 
the home, can visit their parents or relatives more frequently, better taken care of by 
their husbands when ill, threatened less with physical assault and eviction. 
Surprisingly, active borrowers are threatened with murder significantly more. The 
remaining indicators show that active borrowers face lower PDV (not significant) than 
passive borrowers. Table 3 also shows that borrowers experience more domestic 
violence than non-borrowers on five indicators of PDV. By contrast, female 
borrowers on average face significantly less obstacles to work outside and threatened 
less with physical assault and eviction the home than non-borrowers. 
Table 4 represents various indicators of PhDV. An F-test between active and 
passive borrowers indicates that out of 3 indicators active borrowers have 
significantly less PhDV in 2; that is, active borrowers were physically and sexually 
abused significantly less by their husbands relative to passive borrowers. An overall 
comparison between female borrowers and non-borrowers reveals that female 
borrowers are physically assaulted significantly more than non-borrowers. 
[Figure 5 and 6 here] 
In figures 5 and 6, we plot the average PDV of active with passive borrowers 
and borrowers with non-borrowers respectively by household landholding. Figure 5 
shows that the average PDV of passive borrowers is higher than that of active 
borrowers until 50 decimals of landholding. Beyond this threshold the average PDV 
of active borrowers’ overlaps that of passive borrowers.  
[Figure 7 and 8 here] 
Figures 6 and 7 show the average PhDV of active with passive borrowers and 
female borrowers with non-borrowers by households landholding. Figures 7 and 5 are 
analogous. In figure 8, average PhDVs of borrowers and non-borrowers are roughly 
equal up to 40 decimals of land. After that, as land increases, borrower PhDV 
decreases at a faster rate than that of non-borrower.   
 8
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows the results on PDV and PhDV which are constructed using the 
factor analytic techniques. It reveals that non-borrowers face significantly less PDV 
and PhDV than borrowers. It may be because passive borrowers are more vulnerable 
and face higher rates of domestic violence. An F-test between passive and active 
borrowers suggests that on average passive borrowers suffer significantly more PDV 
and PhDV than active borrowers. 
 
4. ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
We adapted the framework in Pitt and Khandker (1998) to estimate the effect of 
program participation on domestic violence, ijDV . The conditional outcome ijDV  for 
an individual i in village j  is: 
(1)  ijjijijij CXDV ??? ????? 21 ,       
Where ijX  is a vector of household characteristics, such as household land, 
dwelling type, age, sex of the household head. ijC  is  the  demand  for  MFIs  credit,  
measured by the amount of credit.13 1?  and 2?  are parameters to be estimated, j?  is 
a village fixed effect and ij?  is the error term. 
Level of participation in one of the credit programs is modeled as  
 (2)  ijjijijij VXC ???? ???? 21 .   
ijV  is identified as instrument. It is assumed that ijV  is uncorrelated with j? , 
ijX , ij?  and ijDV  but correlated with the endogenous regressor, ijC . 1?  and 2?  are 
unknown parameters to be estimated. j?  is the unmeasured determinant of ijC  that is 
fixed within a village and ij?  is the error term. 
We rewrite equation (1) in the following form by splitting borrowers on the 
basis of their control over the use of credit.   
(3) ij
N
fjo
N
fjwjijijij CCVXDV ????? ??????? ?? 4321 . 
fjwC  is the active borrowers’ demand for microfinance. It takes the value of 1 
if a female borrower holds full control over the use of credit and 0 otherwise. fjoC  is 
                                               
13 We also identify the demand for credit by a dummy variable. It takes a value of 1 if the household 
borrows from any of the credit program, 0 otherwise. 
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the demand for microfinance of passive borrowers. It takes the value of 1 if a female 
borrower does not hold full control over the use of credit and 0 otherwise. 1? , 2? , 
3? , and 4?  are unknown parameters, j?  is an unmeasured determinant of the 
dependent variable ijDV  that is fixed within a village and ij?  is the error term. 
The demand for credit of active and passive borrowers are modeled as  
 (4)  ijojoojijoijfjw FGVXC ???? ???? .   
(5)  ijhjhhijijhijfjo FMVXC ???? ???? .   
where jFG  and ijFM  are the availability of a female group in the village and 
the existence of adult female members of a household, respectively. jFG  takes the 
value of 1 if credit program has a female credit group in village j  and  ijFM  takes 
the value of 1 if household i  in village j  has an adult female member. 1?  and 2?  are 
unknown parameters, j? is the unmeasured determined of ijC  that is fixed within a 
village and ij? is the error term. 
 
4.1. Problem in the estimation and solution concept 
The main difficulty in obtaining an unbiased estimator of program participation is 
potential endogeneity that may arise from nonrandom program placement, 
unmeasured village characteristics and unobserved household attributes.14 
 
4.1.1. Solution concept 
We introduce village fixed-effects to solve the endogeneity problem that arises from 
unmeasured village attributes ( j? and j? ) and nonrandom program placement. 
Unobservable household attributes such as self-selection into a credit program cannot 
be solved by village fixed effects. However, the unobservable attributes can affect 
both demand for credit and domestic violence, i.e., cause a correlation between ij?  and 
ij? . The standard approach to the problem of estimating equations with endogenous 
regressors, such as equation (1), is to use instrumental variables. Equation (2) includes 
ijV , which identifies the instrument. Unfortunately, we do not find regressors ijV  that 
                                               
14 For detailes discussion on the endogenity issue see Aktaruzzaman (2009) and Pitt and Khandker 
(1998). 
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can be justified to use as an instrument for demand for credit. We therefore construct 
an instrument through the sample survey.  
We introduce a quasi-experimental sampling design that includes both 
program and non-program villages and both eligible and ineligible households from 
each type of village. Eligible and ineligible households are identified by credit 
program eligibility rule. We identify the eligibility dummy as an instrument of 
demand for credit. 
 
4.2. Identifying the Effects of Credit from the Sample 
We identify the effect of credit on domestic violence in the following way.15 Rewrite 
equation (1): 
(1A1)  ijjijijij CXDV ??? ????? 21 . 
Let us consider two hypothetical villages, village 1 and village 2. Village 1 is a 
non-program village16 [( 1?j ) (the control village)] and at least one credit program is 
working in village 2 [( 2?j ) (the treatment village)]. Further assume that in each 
village there are two types of households, eligible ( 0?X ) (less than 50 decimals of 
household land) and ineligible ( 1?X ) (50 decimals or more of household land). The 
expected value of ijDV  for each type of household in each village is 
(3)  ? ? 10,1 ???? ijij XjDVE , 
(4)  ? ? 111,1 ????? ?ijij XjDVE , 
(5)  ? ? 220,2 ????? ?ijijij CXjDVE , 
Where ijC = mean amount of credit borrowed by the participant households 
(borrower) in the program village. 
(6)  ? ? 211,2 ????? ?ijij XjDVE .  
  
Pitt and Khandker (1998) identify the credit effect by the parameter 2? , 
assuming that the eligibility rule is strictly enforced and no ineligible household is 
offered credit (see Pitt 1999). In practice, the eligibility rule is weakly enforced and 
                                               
15 We follow Aktaruzzaman (2009) and Pitt and Khandker (1998, p. 968) in identifying the credit 
effect. 
16 Non-program village information is required if the exogenous restriction is binary (McKernan et al., 
2005). 
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thus 12.71% of ineligible households got credit in our data.17 Therefore, we modify 
the identification condition for ineligible households in program village provided by 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) and rewrite equation (6) as 
(6A)  ? ? 231,2 ????? ?ijijij CXjDVE  
We identify the effect of credit by 2?  and 3? . 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
To estimate the credit effect, Pitt and Khandker (1998) apply the maximum likelihood 
approach which is referred to as the weighted exogenous sampling maximum 
likelihood–limited information maximum likelihood–fixed effects (WESML-LIML-
FE). Since a weighted two stage instrumental variable (IV) with the village fixed 
effects method provides identical results to WESML-LIML-FE, we use IV estimation 
with village fixed effects. 
We estimate equations (1) and (3) in the second stage. The results are reported 
in table 7, which shows only six explanatory variables of interest [Female, Active, 
Passive borrowers’ dummy and log of borrowed amount by each category of 
borrower (a list of all explanatory variables used in the estimation appears in table 8)]. 
The variables female borrower dummy, active borrower and passive borrower dummy 
are instrumented by the eligibility dummy, eligibility dummy*availability of females’ 
credit group in the village and eligibility dummy*existence of adult female members 
in household respectively in the second stage. We use identical instrumental variables 
for the log of borrowed amount by each category of borrower as borrowing dummies. 
For instance, the log of borrowed amount by female borrowers is instrumented by the 
eligibility dummy. The first stage results are reported in table 6.18 The table shows the 
strength of the instruments. The F-statistics for all instruments are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and it is more than 10.19 These large F-statistics suggest 
that we do not have a weak instrument problem. 
                                               
17 In BIDS-World Bank data, a little over 17% of program households were ineligible at the time they 
joined a credit program. 
18 In the first stage, we estimate equation (2), (4) and (5). 
19 A simple rule of thumb for the case of single instrumental variable is that F statistics should exceed 
10. The value of F is below 10 when the eligibility dummy*the availability of females’ credit group in 
the village is used as independent and the log of active borrowers’ amount is used as dependent 
variable.  However, the F value is more than 10 when the eligibility dummy*the availability of 
females’ credit group in the village and the eligibility dummy *the existence of adult female members 
in household are jointly used. 
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The  first  four  columns  of  table  7  present  the  results  on  PDV,  while  the  last  
four columns report the results on PhDV. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of the table document 
the  estimated  results  of  equation  (1).  The  results  show that  PDV and PhDV are  not  
significantly different for female borrowers and non-borrowers in any specifications. 
This may be because female borrowers are unable to maintain their control over the 
use of credit (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). In our data only 13% of borrowers are able 
to hold full control on credit. The patriarchal social structure of the country allows a 
husband to exploit his spouse to borrow and use it for his own purposes without 
taking much responsibility to repay the obligatory weekly installments (Rahman, 
1999). Therefore, in many cases borrowers are unable to adjust their debt in time and 
are humiliated by the credit officer (Aktaruzzaman, 2009). This creates huge tensions 
within the household and leads to domestic violence.  
In equation (3), we split female borrowers into two groups to address the 
question  of  how  control  over  the  use  of  credit  is  important  in  explaining  domestic  
violence. The estimated results of equation (3) are reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of 
table  the  7.  Results  show  that  both  active  and  passive  borrowers  do  not  experience  
significantly  different  PDV.  The  results  are  robust  even  after  using  the  log  of  the  
borrowed  amount  (column  4).  However,  the  sign  of  the  active  borrowers’  credit  
coefficient is negative, while the passive borrowers’ credit coefficient is positive.  
Unlike  PDV,  the  active  borrowers’  PhDV  is  significantly  lower  than  that  of  
non-borrowers. Table 7 shows that 3?  of equation (3) is -3.11; i.e., the probability of 
experiencing PhDV, is 3.11 points less for an active borrower than the control group 
woman  and  3.65  points  less  than  the  passive  borrower.  We  also  use  the  log  of  the  
borrowed amount (column 7 and 8), in which the coefficient on credit measures the 
probabilistic change in outcomes with respect to percentage change in borrowing. 
Column 8 reveals that a 1% increase in the average credit would decrease the 
probability of experiencing physical domestic violence by .004 points. This result 
shows that a 1% increase in the active borrowers’ credit amount reduces the incidence 
of average PhDV against them by 1.002%.    
The active borrowers’ PDV is not significantly less perhaps because when a 
woman controls the credit, her husband cannot accept it because for the attitude 
towards women. In some instances, the husband takes his wife’s investment away and 
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spends it for his own purposes.20 Such activities induce tensions within the household 
and in most cases wives are psychologically abused by their partner. On the other 
hand,  the  active  borrowers  are  less  physically  or  sexually  harassed  because  of  their  
control over economic resources and services, which helps to build their confidence 
and awareness, and empower them economically. An active borrower’s husband is 
often afraid to assault  his wife physically because of the fear that  she may raise this 
issue at the weekly group meetings21 or take legal action against him.   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
This paper estimates the effects of microcredit on domestic violence of program 
participants. We consider only those households which have both the husband and the 
wife, and only female borrowers from the borrower category as our sample. We split 
female borrowers into two categories on the basis of their control over credit. We call 
them active borrowers,  who  have  full  control  over  the  use  of  credit,  and  passive 
borrowers, who do not have full control.  
We introduced a quasi-experimental sampling design to address the 
endogeneity issues arising from self-selection and village-level heterogeneity, which 
allows us to include both program and non-program villages and both eligible and 
ineligible household from each type of village. Eligible and ineligible households are 
identified by an eligibility rule of the credit programs. We use the eligibility rule as an 
instrument for demand for credit.   
Our results show that participation in microfinance does not diminish domestic 
violence significantly, because female borrowers have little or no control over the use 
of credit. The husband exploits his spouse’s borrowing without taking much 
responsibility to repay the weekly installment which escalates family tensions and 
results in domestic violence. Only 13% of borrowers in our sample have full control 
of the credit and experience .04 points less PhDV. Our findings suggest that providing 
credit to women is not a sufficient mechanism to improve their status without 
                                               
20 A study on Kenya by Anderson and Baland (2002) shows that the motivation for women to join the 
ROSCAs saving program is to keep the money away from their husbands. 
21 Every group meets weekly in the presence of a credit officer for half an hour or so as to pay the 
weekly installment on their credit as well as mandatory contributions to savings and insurance funds. 
At the meeting, they also discuss consciousness-raising, civil responsibilities, and altering attitudes 
toward society. 
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monitoring them. Monitoring may also reduce the probability of investing the credit 
for the purposes other than those declared.22  
 Credit programs can support their borrowers by providing an integrated 
program as an alternative to monitoring. Training support programs regarding 
investments and adult education can enhance women’s consciousness of the gender 
and power relations. Training programs for investment in particular can secure the 
investment and reduce the possibility of misusing the credit. This also helps women to 
build their confidence in using the credit efficiently without their husband’s help. 
BRAC and Grameen Bank claim that they offer training before issuing the credit 
among  the  borrowers  as  part  of  social  development  (Khandker,  1997).  In  fact,  very  
few borrowers were offered training.   For example, the BIDS-World Bank 1991/92 
data shows that only 0.8% of borrowers had a trade related technical and vocational 
training opportunity from BRAC and no borrower was found to receive training from 
Grameen Bank. Similarly, our data shows that not a single borrower has received any 
kind of training from any of the credit programs. 
The attitudes of international aid donor agencies to the Bangladeshi credit 
programs need to be reviewed. International aid donor agencies are more interested in 
the financial self-sustainability of the credit programs (Goetz and Gupta 1996) than 
the quality of services they offer to the poor. As a result of mitigating the requirement 
of donor agencies, aid dependent credit programs concentrate only on a high 
repayment rate without considering the service quality. Donor agencies should assess 
the social development activities of credit programs as a precondition to providing 
them fund.  
  
 
 
                                               
22 Rahman (1999) finds that 78% of the loans are used for purposes other than those officially declared. 
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Figure 1. Co-occurrence o different 
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Table 1. Cases of Reported Violence against Women in 2002-2007 
Year Women oppression 
Rape  Acid 
throwing  
Seriously 
injured  
Other  Total  
2002  3702  214  1079  11346  17153  
2003  4118  207  1209  12853  18337  
2004  2865  191  663  8023  11643  
2005  2556  183  568  7561  10871  
2006  2453  145  1205  7421  10622  
2007  3345  147  676  9084  13244  
Total  19639  1087  5400  56244  81870  
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Bangladesh (GOB). 
 
Table 2. Prevalence of Physical and Sexual Violence against Reproductive Aged 
Women 
Type of violence % of woman suffered 
Rural  Urban  
Physical violence  44  46  
Sexual violence  44  41  
Physical or sexual violence  60  61  
Physical and sexual violence  27  26  
Source: International Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research in Bangladesh 
(ICDDR-B). 
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Table 3.  Weighted Means, Standard Deviation and Adjusted Wald test of Questions Related Psychological Domestic Violence (PDV) 
 
Note:  1. Sample size is 69 villages, 94 active borrowers, 602 passive borrowers, and 648 non-borrowers. 
2. Figures in the parenthesis are linearized standard error. 
3. 1% significance is denoted by ***, 5% by ** and 10% by *. 
Type of 
households 
Forced not 
to work out 
side home 
Husband’s 
permission 
is required 
to visit 
parent or 
relative 
Relatives 
fear to 
come at 
resident 
for 
husband 
Husband 
takes care 
of you if 
you are 
ill 
Husband 
dictated 
who to 
vote in the 
last 
election 
Husband 
have more 
than one 
spouse 
Threatened 
for dowry 
Threatened 
with 
divorced 
Threatened 
with 
physical 
assault 
 
Threatened 
with 
eviction 
from home 
 
Threatened 
with 
murder 
 
All Households .40 (.49) 
.30 
(.46) 
.04 
(.21) 
.97    
(.14) 
.50 
(.50) 
.03 
(.17) 
.05 
(.22) 
.18 
(.38) 
.65 
(.47) 
.49 
(.50) 
.02 
(.15) 
            
Non-borrower .359     (.020) 
.350 
(.020) 
.070    
(.011) 
.980    
(.006) 
.556     
(.021) 
.028    
(.006) 
.091    
(.013) 
.181   
(.016) 
.626   
(.021) 
.460   
(.021) 
.040    
 (.009) 
Female 
borrowers 
.427  
(.020) 
.291 
(.018) 
.037    
(.007) 
.980     
(.004) 
.476    
(.020) 
.028    
(.006) 
.031   
(.006) 
.173    
(.015) 
.679    
(.018) 
.519    
(.020) 
.019   
(.005) 
 
Passive 
Borrowers 
.456 
(.021) 
.306    
(.020) 
.040    
(.008) 
.984    
(.004) 
.483 
(.021) 
.029   
(.007) 
.032     
(.007) 
.168    
(.016) 
.724    
(.019) 
.552   
(.021) 
.018    
(.006) 
Active Borrowers .242    (.047) 
.193    
(.041) 
.020     
(.011) 
.954    
(.017) 
.435    
(.055) 
.022    
(.017) 
.021    
(.012) 
.204  
(.047) 
.385    
(.054) 
.300    
(.050) 
.046    
(.024) 
            
Adjusted Wald test           
 Non-borrower and 
female borrowers 5.72**    5.95** 5.58**    0.00 7.25**  0.00     16.81***   .13     3.47*     3.91**    3.63* 
Passive and active  
borrowers 16.59*** 5.87**     1.89     2.83*     .64 .14 .68 .57 33.93*** 20.92***    1.20     
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Table 4. Weighted Means, Standard Deviation and Adjusted Wald test of questions 
related Physical Domestic Violence (PhDV) 
Note: 1. Sample size is 69 villages, 94 active borrowers, 602 passive borrowers, and 
648 non-borrowers. 
2. Figures in the parenthesis are linearized standard error. 
3. 1% significance is denoted by ***, 5% by ** and 10% by *. 
 
Table 5. Weighted Means, Standard Deviation and Adjusted Wald test of 
Psychological Domestic Violence (PDV) and Physical Domestic Violence (PhDV) 
 
Type of households 
PDV PhDV 
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
Non-borrowers -.072 .074 -.067 .053 
Female borrowers .015 .056 .101 .050 
 
Passive Borrowers .101 .059 .166 .052 
Active Borrowers -.549 .148 -.326 .157 
Adjusted Wald test    
Non-borrowers and 
borrowers .88  5.16*  
Passive and active 
borrowers 16.59***  8.82**  
Note: 1. Sample size is 69 villages, 94 active borrowers, 602 passive borrowers, and 
648 non-borrowers. 
2. Figures in the parenthesis are linearized standard error. 
3. 1% significance is denoted by ***, 5% by ** and 10% by *. 
 
 
 
Type of households  
Physical abuse Evicted from home Sexual  abuse 
coefficient std. err coefficient std. err coefficient std. err 
Non-borrowers .462 .021 .087 .012 .460 .021 
Female borrowers .558 .020 .091 .012 .502 .020 
 
Passive Borrowers .595 .021 .091 .012 .522 .021 
Active Borrowers .316 .052 .092 .032 .372 .054 
Adjusted Wald test  
Non-borrowers and 
borrowers 10.49**  .06  2.00  
Passive  and active 
borrowers 25.16***  .00  6.42**  
 22
Table 6. Demand for Microfinance 
Explanatory variables  
Dependent variables 
Borrowing dummy  Log of borrowed amount 
Equation 2 Equation 4 Equation 5 Join 
significance test 
 Equation 2 Equation 4 Equation 5 Join significance 
test 
Eligibility dummy .220***   (.045) 
    2.043*** 
(.454) 
   
Eligibility dummy* Females’ 
credit group in the village 
 .095**   
(.021) 
 .224* 
(.132) 
  .684** 
(.227) 
 .359 
(1.298) 
Eligibility dummy* Adult 
female in household 
  .206***  
(.045) 
.078 
(.126) 
   2.089*** 
(.456) 
1.776   
(1.241) 
Observations 1342 1342 1342 1342  1342 1342 1342 1342 
F statistics for          
Eligibility dummy 23.88***     20.22***    
Eligibility dummy* Females’ 
credit group in the village  
19.80***     9.08**   
Eligibility dummy* Adult 
female in household  
 20.44***     21.00***  
Eligibility dummy* Females’ 
credit group in the village and 
Eligibility dummy* Adult 
female in household 
 
  20.34***    
 
10.65*** 
Notes: 1. 10 control variables, village fixed effect and intercept are not reported.  
2. 1% significance is denoted by ***, 5% by ** and 10% by *. 
3. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Microfinance on Psychological Domestic Violence (PDV) and Physical Domestic Violence (PHDV) 
Explanatory variables 
Depended variables 
PDV  PhDV 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Female borrowers -.655 (.496) 
    
 
-.447    
(.400) 
   
Active Borrowers  -3.656   (2.528) 
    -3.11**   
(1.559) 
  
Passive Borrowers  .745   (1.175) 
    .778  
(.759) 
  
Log of borrowed amount by Female    -.071 (.054) 
    -.048   
(.043) 
 
Log of borrowed amount by active borrowers    -.485    (.356) 
    -.414*   
(.230)  
Log of borrowed amount by passive borrowers    .066   (.121) 
    .070   
(.0831) 
Constant .525 (.818) 
.076   
(.962) 
.548   
(.830) 
.383   
(1.05) 
 
 
.72    
(.599) 
-.312  
(.750) 
.087  
(.608) 
-.044  
(.846) 
Sample 1342 1342 1342 1342  1342 1342 1342 1342 
Note: 1. ‘Female borrowers’ is a dummy variable. It takes value 1 if borrower is female. Active and passive borrower is also dummy variables. 
2. 1% significance is denoted by ***, 5% by ** and 10% by *. 
3. Figures in the parenthesis are standard errors. 
4. 10 control variables, village fixed effect and constant are not reported. 
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Table 8. Weighted Means and Standard Deviation of Independent Variables by Different Categories of Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1. Sample size is 69 villages, 94 active borrowers, 602 passive borrowers, and 648 non-borrowers. 
2. Figures in the parenthesis are standard deviation. 
 
 
Independent variables 
Mean 
Measuring 
Unit 
Active 
Borrower 
Passive 
Borrower Borrower 
Non-
Borrower All Sample 
Cumulative amount of credit from 2002 -06 Taka 22944.05   (32168.88) 
26397.3   
(24822.42) 
25938.97    
(25917.4) 0 
13226.62    
(23064.74) 
Land Decimals  12.161  (28.677) 
23.485 
(40.870) 
21.982   
(39.639) 
44.28807   
(119.438) 
46.363 
(118.035) 
Religion  Muslim-1, Non-muslim-0 
.856 
  (.352) 
.815   
(.388) 
.820   
(.383) 
.910   
(.285) 
.891 
(.311) 
Highest grade completed by  Household 
Head Year 
2.957 
(4.407) 
3.645   
(4.123) 
3.554   
(4.117) 
3.121   
(4.00) 
3.281 
(4.071) 
Sex of household head Male-1, Female-0 
.917   
(.277) 
.990  
(.097) 
.980   
(.137) 
.990   
(.094) 
.985 
(.118) 
Age of household head Year 41.77   (12.24) 
41.961  
(12.086) 
41.936   
(12.099) 
41.696   
(11.998) 
42.014 
(12.074) 
Type of dwelling 
Full, Semi-pucca 
Building-0, 
Non- pucca -1 
.959   
(.199) 
.890   
(.312) 
.899   
(.300) 
.912   
(.282) 
.904 
(.293) 
Number of adult  male ( age above 18) Number 1.376   (.886) 
1.456   
(.799) 
1.445   
(.811) 
1.394 
(.770) 
1.456 
(.833) 
Distance of household dwelling from the 
closest neighbor Meter 
9.991  
(10.711) 
11.154   
(12.307) 
11.000   
(12.107) 
17.836   
(63.185) 
15.503 
(51.948) 
Distance of  household dwelling from 
entrance point of the village Meter 
723.411    
(410.387) 
679.729   
(471.446) 
685.498   
(463.811) 
681.890   
(537.614) 
690.017 
(519.318) 
